Recent Developments in Indian Foreign Policy

India & Afghanistan

The relationship between India and Afghanistan carries the weight of ancient civilisational exchange. Since independence in 1947, the two countries formalised their ties through a Friendship Treaty in 1950, and the evolution of this relationship across subsequent decades has been shaped by three recurring determinants: the triangular dynamic arising from India's troubled relations with Pakistan, the shifting domestic political landscape within Afghanistan, and the broader flux of the international environment.

The first phase of modern relations lasted from 1947 to the end of the Cold War and was characterised by general cordiality. The longstanding territorial dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan over Pashtunistan and the Durand Line made Kabul a natural partner for New Delhi, since both capitals maintained adversarial postures toward Islamabad. This equation was complicated by the Soviet military intervention of 1979. India adopted a stance of studied neutrality, shaped by its close alignment with Moscow and the Cold War logic of non-alignment. That neutrality cost India standing with the Afghan resistance as well as with Western governments that backed the Mujahideen.

The second phase ran from 1991 to 2001 and saw a drastic contraction of Indian influence. The collapse of the Soviet Union destabilised the Afghan state, and the pro-Soviet government of Najibullah - with which India had maintained cordial ties - was overthrown in April 1992. India's position briefly recovered under Burhanuddin Rabbani's government between 1992 and 1996, but the Taliban's capture of Kabul in 1996, made possible by Pakistan's security apparatus, eliminated this foothold. As Ayesha Jalal has argued, Pakistan's establishment deployed battle-tested militants across the Line of Control into Kashmir as a deliberate strategy to keep India's most sensitive dispute in international focus. India responded by extending covert support to the Northern Alliance - a Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara coalition resisting Taliban rule. The Research and Analysis Wing contributed approximately ten million dollars' worth of high-altitude warfare equipment to the Alliance and established a medical facility near Farkhor on the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border. India also deepened ties with Russia and Iran, both of which shared an interest in checking Taliban expansion. J.N. Dixit articulated the underlying strategic logic by arguing that India, in concert with like-minded countries, needed to resist the coercive propagation of religious extremism that destabilised the region, and that an early resolution of the Afghan crisis was indispensable for unlocking the economic potential of Eurasia.

The third phase opened after the September 2001 attacks, when American intervention toppled the Taliban and created the most significant opening India had ever had to build influence in Afghanistan. Following the Bonn Conference in December 2001, which installed an interim government under Hamid Karzai, India pledged one hundred million dollars in reconstruction assistance. Over the following decade, India became one of Afghanistan's largest development partners, channelling more than two billion dollars across infrastructure, education, health, and capacity-building. The flagship projects included the 280-kilometre Zaranj-Delaram highway linking Afghanistan to the Iranian border at Zaranj, the Salma Dam hydropower facility in Herat province - jointly inaugurated as the Afghan-India Friendship Dam - and a 220-kilovolt transmission line connecting Kabul to Pul-e-Khumri. A Preferential Trade Agreement signed during President Karzai's visit to India in March 2003 extended one hundred percent tariff concessions on 38 categories of Afghan exports. Harsh Pant assessed that India had a fundamental strategic interest in Afghanistan's emergence as a stable and economically integrated state, since instability there has historically been channelled into pressure on Kashmir. The Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in October 2011 during Karzai's visit to New Delhi created a formal legal framework governing political and economic cooperation. Under Modi, India moved past its earlier reluctance to supply only non-lethal assistance, transferring four Mi-25 attack helicopters to Kabul in December 2015 and jointly inaugurating the Afghan-India Friendship Dam with President Ghani in June 2016.

The fourth phase began in August 2021 with the Taliban's return to power following the American withdrawal. India evacuated its personnel and citizens under Operation Devi Shakti. Despite declining to formally recognise the Islamic Emirate, India has pursued calibrated engagement with the Taliban administration. A technical mission was sent to Kabul in mid-2022 to restore limited diplomatic contact. Humanitarian assistance has included 500,000 doses of Covid vaccine, 2,500 metric tonnes of wheat, earthquake relief supplies, and a development assistance pledge of 200 crore rupees announced in February 2023. India has used Iran's Chabahar Port to route wheat shipments to Afghanistan, circumventing Pakistan's refusal of overland transit. Approximately 14,000 Afghan students remained enrolled in Indian universities under ICCR scholarships as of 2023. India's participation in the Taliban-convened Regional Cooperation Initiative reflects a pragmatic willingness to engage the new authorities without extending formal recognition.

The strategic stakes of Afghanistan remain stark. For Pakistan, Afghanistan represents strategic depth - control over Kabul provides operational space in conflict with India and a platform for proxy pressure in Kashmir. For India, the irreducible objective is to prevent Afghanistan from serving as a base for anti-India terrorism and to deny Pakistan unchallenged dominance over this space. For China, a stable Afghanistan that does not shelter Uighur militants and does not obstruct Belt and Road connectivity is the priority. In this framework, Afghanistan functions as a zero-sum arena for India and Pakistan in a way it does not for any other external actor.

India & the Iraq Crisis

India's relationship with Iraq carries both ancient and modern dimensions. The port of Basra served as a node in the maritime trade network linking the Indus Valley civilisation with Mesopotamia as early as 1800 BCE. In the modern period, a Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1952, and throughout the Cold War the two countries maintained broadly cooperative relations, sharing non-aligned orientations and complementary economic interests. Before the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 and the first Gulf War of 1991, Iraq was among India's largest export markets, and the Indian Air Force trained hundreds of Iraqi pilots on Soviet-supplied aircraft. Prior to 1991, more than 80,000 Indian nationals resided in Iraq.

India's position on the 1991 Gulf War was one of implicit opposition to the use of force. New Delhi halted the refuelling of American military aircraft after the second week of the war and opposed UN sanctions on Iraq, though it complied with them in practice. India's commercial and diplomatic ties with Baghdad contracted sharply during the years of Iraqi isolation under international sanctions.

The 2003 American invasion of Iraq presented India with a direct challenge. India declined to support the invasion and refused a request from Washington to deploy troops as part of a stabilisation force. The position was grounded in India's principled opposition to the unilateral use of force without UN Security Council authorisation, its assessment that the invasion would destabilise the region, and its awareness that a large Indian diaspora and significant energy interests were exposed to the consequences. India committed twenty million dollars in post-war humanitarian relief and an additional ten million dollars to the UN-administered Iraq Reconstruction Fund Facility, supporting a democratic and federal reconstitution of the Iraqi state.

The implications of the Iraq crisis for India's security and foreign policy have been analysed along several dimensions. The most direct was energy security: Iraq has consistently ranked among India's top three suppliers of crude oil, and instability there - particularly the rise of the Islamic State in 2014 and its seizure of Mosul - created acute anxiety about the reliability of supply from the Gulf region. When ISIS kidnapped 39 Indian construction workers in Mosul in 2014, the Indian government mounted a protracted diplomatic and intelligence effort to recover them, which ultimately revealed that all 39 had been killed. This episode dramatised the vulnerability of the Indian diaspora in conflict zones and prompted a revaluation of India's consular and evacuation capabilities. India subsequently evacuated thousands of Indian nationals from Iraq as the ISIS advance threatened additional areas. The instability also prompted Indian policymakers to consider diversifying energy sources and routes.

Bilateral relations normalised as the ISIS threat receded and a functioning government was re-established in Baghdad. Trade recovered steadily, reaching approximately 34.33 billion dollars in 2021-22, driven predominantly by crude oil imports. Iraqi NSA Qassem Al-Araji visited India in March 2023, and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar met his Iraqi counterpart in 2024, marking a diplomatic revitalisation. India has also announced the opening of a consulate in Najaf, the Shia pilgrimage city, which hosts a significant concentration of Indian pilgrims and workers. Indian companies including ONGC Videsh and IOCL have maintained upstream oil sector presence in Iraq, and Indian infrastructure firms operate in the Kurdistan region. The trajectory of the relationship reflects India's broader West Asia calculus: a careful balance of energy security, diaspora protection, and diplomatic equidistance in a structurally volatile region.

India's West Asia Policy

India's engagement with West Asia rests on foundations that predate the modern state system. Ancient trade in textiles, gems, and agricultural commodities connected the subcontinent to the Arabian Peninsula and Mesopotamia, and this civilisational linkage has informed India's sense of the region as a natural economic and cultural partner. In the contemporary context, West Asia's significance for India is defined by the intersection of energy dependence, diaspora, remittances, trade, and emerging strategic partnership.

The scale of India's economic stake is considerable. India's total annual trade with the West Asian region exceeds 170 billion dollars, surpassing its trade with both the United States (around 128 billion dollars) and the European Union (around 134 billion dollars). More than half of India's energy imports originate in Arab countries, with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the UAE as the principal suppliers. The Indian diaspora in the Gulf numbers approximately seven million; Indians constitute roughly 30 percent of the UAE's population. Remittances from this community represent one of India's most significant sources of foreign exchange. As Sanjay Bhattacharya has observed, the relationship has evolved beyond the hydrocarbon buyer-seller dynamic to encompass participation in upstream and downstream energy projects, joint refinery ventures, and the development of strategic petroleum reserves.

The Gulf states are themselves in a structural transition. Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, the UAE's ambitions as a global trade and technology hub, and Qatar's drive to host international events and conferences are all generating enormous demand for investment, construction, and skilled labour - demand that India is uniquely positioned to meet. Saudi Arabia has pledged investment worth 100 billion dollars in India across petrochemicals, infrastructure, manufacturing, and mining. The UAE committed to invest 7 billion dollars in an Indian food corridor. The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed between India and the UAE in February 2022 set a target of 100 billion dollars in bilateral non-oil merchandise trade within five years. These developments reflect what former Vice President Hamid Ansari described as West Asia's "curse of centrality" - the region's strategic importance makes it perpetually contested - but India is increasingly positioned to exploit this centrality rather than be constrained by it.

India's soft power in the region is substantial. The large and well-regarded Indian diaspora, the cultural reach of Bollywood, Modi's inauguration of Abu Dhabi's first Hindu stone temple in 2024, and India's reputation for non-interference and democratic governance all contribute to Indian influence. Gulf governments have increasingly aligned with India on security questions: after the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, Saudi Arabia publicly expressed understanding of India's approach in Jammu and Kashmir. The Abraham Accords of 2020 have simplified one dimension of India's balancing act in the region by reducing the binary pressure between Arab solidarity and engagement with Israel. India continues to maintain diplomatic relations with both Riyadh and Tehran and carefully avoids being drawn into their rivalry. American strategic disengagement from the Gulf, driven by reduced energy dependence and the pivot to China, creates additional space for India to emerge as a security partner and economic stakeholder in the region. S. Jaishankar has argued that West Asia should be seen not as a theatre for displaying India's power but as a space for augmenting it, and that India should aspire to leadership rather than mere balance in its regional diplomacy.

India's Relations with the US: Growing Partnership

The transformation of India-US relations from the Cold War era of estrangement to the contemporary strategic partnership constitutes one of the most consequential realignments in Asian geopolitics. During the Cold War, the relationship was constrained by India's non-aligned posture and its close ties with the Soviet Union, American support for Pakistan as a frontline state, and recurring crises including the 1971 East Pakistan war, during which Nixon ordered a carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal in a gesture of pressure on India. The relationship reached its lowest point in 1998 when the United States imposed sanctions following India's Pokhran-II nuclear tests, only to begin a process of rapid normalisation and deepening in subsequent years.

The pivot toward partnership was initiated under the Clinton administration and accelerated under George W. Bush, whose administration recognised that a rising India was a strategic asset for American interests in Asia. The most consequential expression of this recognition was the 2005 India-US civil nuclear framework, which culminated in the 123 Agreement and the NSG waiver of 2008 - effectively recognising India as a de facto nuclear weapons state and integrating it into the global civil nuclear commerce network. The agreement was described by C. Raja Mohan as carrying profound geopolitical significance as an acknowledgement of India's status as a major power, and by Sumit Ganguly as reflecting Washington's calculation that a stronger New Delhi would help balance a rising Beijing.

The partnership has deepened across multiple domains. Defence cooperation, which barely existed before 2000, has grown into one of the most substantial bilateral defence relationships in Asia. India has concluded Foundational Agreements with the US - GSOMIA (2002), LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018), and BECA (2020) - which enable logistics sharing, communication interoperability, and the exchange of advanced geospatial intelligence. Annual bilateral defence trade has exceeded 20 billion dollars, with India procuring C-17 transport aircraft, P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, Apache and Chinook helicopters, and M777 artillery. The QUAD - the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue linking India, the United States, Japan, and Australia - has been elevated to the level of leaders' summits under the Biden administration and is widely understood as a mechanism for managing China's strategic ascendancy in the Indo-Pacific. Technological cooperation under the iCET (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology) framework launched in 2023 covers semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and space. The US is now India's largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding 190 billion dollars.

Structural tensions nonetheless persist. India's continued purchase of Russian energy and defence equipment - including the S-400 air defence system - has generated friction with Washington, which threatened CAATSA sanctions. India's refusal to align with the Western position on the Ukraine war, choosing instead to increase oil purchases from Russia at discounted prices and abstaining on UN resolutions condemning the invasion, signalled the limits of strategic convergence. India's membership of the SCO and BRICS alongside China and Russia complicates the binary framing that some in Washington would prefer. The relationship is therefore best characterised as a convergent but not allied partnership - one grounded in shared interests in a stable Indo-Pacific, technology exchange, and counter-terrorism cooperation, while retaining Indian strategic autonomy as its organising principle.

India-Israel Relations

India and Israel share a relationship whose history P.R. Kumaraswamy has described as marked by surprising inconsistency. India recognised Israel in 1950 but declined to establish full diplomatic relations for more than four decades. Gandhi's opposition to the creation of a Jewish state - articulated in his assertion that Palestine belonged to the Arabs as England belonged to the English - was carried forward by Nehru into official policy, and India's vote against Israeli membership in the United Nations in 1947 reflected the non-aligned logic of solidarity with Arab nationalism and the Palestinian cause.

The transformation of the relationship was driven by structural changes in the international system rather than by any ideological reorientation. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 removed India's principal arms supplier and created an urgent need to diversify defence procurement. India's economic liberalisation of the same year created new imperatives for international engagement. Egypt's peace agreement with Israel in the 1970s and the gradual relaxation of Arab hostility toward Israel had progressively reduced the political cost of closer ties. India opened a full embassy in Tel Aviv in 1992, and the bilateral relationship has since grown at an accelerating pace. Trade rose from 200 million dollars in 1992 to over 10.77 billion dollars excluding defence in 2022-23. Israel has become India's second-largest defence supplier after Russia, with annual purchases exceeding one billion dollars.

The defence and security relationship constitutes the most consequential pillar. India has procured integrated underwater harbour defence systems, surface-to-air missiles, surveillance systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel. In 2021, the Defence Research and Development Organisation and its Israeli counterpart signed a Bilateral Innovation Agreement providing for joint development of drones, robotics, artificial intelligence, and quantum technologies. Counter-terrorism cooperation and real-time intelligence sharing on common threats from jihadist networks form another dimension of the security partnership.

Agricultural cooperation represents a second major pillar. Israel's expertise in water-efficient cultivation has been transferred to Indian conditions through 29 Centres of Excellence across 12 Indian states, jointly developed under a comprehensive agricultural cooperation framework first formalised in 2006. Israeli drip irrigation technology is now widely deployed across Indian agriculture. Space cooperation has added a third dimension: ISRO has launched Israeli radar imaging satellites using the PSLV, and collaboration in this domain has deepened steadily since 2002. Modi became the first sitting Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel in 2017, and the personal relationship between Modi and Netanyahu has accelerated institutional connectivity. Ambassador Ron Malka described the relationship as an emotional one grounded in natural mutual trust.

Structural constraints limit the scope of the partnership. India's formal position on Palestine - recognition of the PLO in 1974 and the State of Palestine in 1988, support for the two-state solution, and consistent advocacy in multilateral forums for Palestinian rights - remains officially unchanged. The October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent military campaign in Gaza placed India in a delicate position. India's abstention on several UN General Assembly resolutions calling for humanitarian ceasefires reflected the tension between its traditional solidarity with the Palestinian cause and its deepening strategic relationship with Israel. China's growing economic relationship with Israel - Beijing is Israel's second-largest trading partner while India ranks seventh - is an additional complication. India's deep energy and diaspora dependence on Gulf Arab countries creates a structural ceiling on public alignment with Israel. The strategic logic of the partnership - rooted in shared experience of cross-border terrorism, complementary technological capabilities, and converging threat perceptions - continues to strengthen the relationship within these constraints.

Vision of a New World Order

India's articulation of a new world order has acquired conceptual clarity and diplomatic urgency in the context of India's rise as a major power and the deepening dysfunction of the post-1945 international architecture. The existing institutions of global governance - the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation - were designed by and for the Western powers that dominated the 1945 settlement. As Happymon Jacob has summarised it, India's assessment of this order can be captured in three words: unequal, discriminatory, and unrepresentative. India does not seek to overthrow this order but to reform it so that it reflects the demographic, economic, and political realities of the twenty-first century rather than the power configuration of the mid-twentieth.

S. Jaishankar has emerged as the most articulate official voice of this evolving vision. In his framework, India no longer needs to conform to norms established by other powers; it should instead adopt a pragmatic rather than ideological approach to international relations, standing neither with the West nor with China, and exploiting the opportunities created by global contradictions. This interests-first approach, grounded in recognition of India's position as the world's fifth-largest economy with aspirations to third-largest by the early 2030s, signals a willingness to shape the rules of international order rather than accept them. Shruti Kapila has assessed this shift more sceptically, arguing that national self-interest rather than any grand vision of international harmony defines India's new global posture. The Indian government's G20 presidency in 2023 adopted the theme "One Earth, One Family, One Future" - a phrase drawing on the civilisational concept of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam - which encapsulated the aspiration to combine self-interest with a broader humanitarian framing.

Four broad pillars define India's vision. The first is reform of global governance institutions to make them more representative and accountable - the demand for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council is the most prominent expression of this, alongside calls for restructuring IMF and World Bank voting arrangements. The second is the establishment of a rules-based, open, and balanced trade regime that addresses the structural disadvantages faced by the Global South, including asymmetries in technology transfer, intellectual property, agricultural subsidies, and non-tariff barriers. The third is climate justice: India insists on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, arguing that developed countries bear a greater historical responsibility for cumulative emissions and must commit to deeper reductions and provide climate finance to support developing economies' transitions. The fourth is multipolarity: India views the emergence of a multipolar order not as a threat to stability but as an opportunity for greater autonomy and influence.

H.V. Shringla articulated India's positive vision as one of a multipolar international order underpinned by international law, respectful of sovereignty and territorial integrity, committed to peaceful resolution of disputes, and ensuring free access to the global commons. C. Raja Mohan has described India as aspiring to serve as a bridge between the Global North and the Global South, combining democratic and market values with the developmental priorities and historical grievances of the developing world. Jaishankar's formulation of India as non-Western but not anti-Western encapsulates this positioning.

A crucial nuance in India's multipolarity argument is that a genuinely multipolar global order requires a multipolar Asia. A world in which only the United States and China exercise decisive influence within Asia would not serve India's interests even if broader global multipolarity were achieved. India therefore supports a diffusion of power across Asia - encompassing Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, and India itself - as a necessary complement to global multipolarity. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the Act East Policy, and India's deepening Indo-Pacific partnerships all serve this strategic logic. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor proposed at the 2023 G20 summit is conceived as a connectivity alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative. Modi's Shangri-La Dialogue address in 2018 articulated the Indo-Pacific vision as inclusive and ASEAN-centric, predicated on a rules-based order applied equally to all and connectivity that empowers rather than indebts. India consistently describes itself as a reformist rather than revisionist power - one that seeks to change the system through persuasion and coalition-building rather than confrontation.

Neighbourhood First Policy

India's Neighbourhood First Policy rests on the recognition that India's aspirations to global power status are not credible if its immediate region remains unstable, underdeveloped, or increasingly oriented toward China. The policy was announced as a formal priority by the Modi government at the 2014 inauguration - symbolised by the invitation extended to all SAARC leaders - though it builds on a longer tradition of thinking about regional engagement, from Nehru's Asian solidarity framework to the Gujral Doctrine of the 1990s.

The structural asymmetry of South Asia frames every dimension of India's neighbourhood engagement. India accounts for roughly 75 percent of the region's aggregate GDP, 70 percent of its landmass, and 75 percent of its population. This concentration means that every smaller neighbour simultaneously depends on India and harbours anxieties about Indian dominance. The Gujral Doctrine, articulated by Prime Minister I.K. Gujral in 1996, attempted to manage this asymmetry through five principles: non-reciprocal generosity in dealings with smaller neighbours; non-interference in their internal affairs; respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; peaceful resolution of disputes; and a commitment that no country's territory would be used against another's interests. The doctrine represented the insight that India's size required strategic generosity to build the regional goodwill necessary for leadership.

The Modi government's formulation of Neighbourhood First shares this core logic but supplements it with greater emphasis on connectivity, economic integration, and sub-regional frameworks as practical vehicles for cooperation that SAARC has failed to provide. Established in 1985, SAARC has conducted only 18 summits in nearly four decades of existence. The 19th summit was cancelled in 2016 after India declined to attend following the Uri terrorist attack, and no summit has taken place since. The SAARC Charter's unanimity requirement gives Pakistan an effective veto over the organisation's agenda, blocking agreements on connectivity, energy trade, and trade facilitation that a majority of members support. SAFTA, the South Asian Free Trade Area launched in 2006, has remained limited in its implementation and has not generated the integration its architects envisaged.

India's response to SAARC's paralysis has been to invest in alternative frameworks that exclude Pakistan. BIMSTEC - the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, linking Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan, and Nepal - has been elevated as the preferred vehicle for sub-regional cooperation on connectivity, trade, counter-terrorism, and energy. Modi attended the 2025 BIMSTEC Summit in Thailand, reinforcing this prioritisation. The BBIN framework - grouping Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal - has developed specific agreements on motor vehicle transit, energy connectivity, and inland waterways. Bilateral frameworks have been developed for each neighbour: strategic partnerships with Bangladesh, energy supply agreements with Bhutan, maritime security cooperation with Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and connectivity diplomacy with Nepal. India's SAGAR framework - Security and Growth for All in the Region - positions India as the net security provider across the Indian Ocean, delivering maritime surveillance, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, and capacity-building to island nations and littoral states.

China's expanding footprint in South Asia is the most significant external challenge to India's neighbourhood policy. Beijing has deployed Belt and Road Initiative investment to build ports, roads, pipelines, and power infrastructure across Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal. The Hambantota port lease in Sri Lanka and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor are the most prominent examples of Chinese connectivity that India views as strategic encirclement. India's response has been to accelerate its own connectivity investments: cross-border rail links with Bangladesh, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project connecting the northeastern states to Myanmar, the Chabahar Port in Iran as a western gateway, and multiple cross-border electricity transmission lines. India also provided 4 billion dollars in financial assistance to Sri Lanka during its economic crisis of 2022, positioning itself as a more responsive and less conditional creditor than either China or the IMF.

The record of the Neighbourhood First Policy is mixed. Pakistan remains the most intractable problem - the absence of normalised trade and transport across the India-Pakistan border constitutes a structural barrier to South Asian integration that India cannot resolve unilaterally. Nepal's 2015 constitution crisis, during which an Indian trade disruption perceived as a blockade pushed Kathmandu closer to Beijing, illustrated how India's size can turn economic interdependence into a source of resentment rather than goodwill. The political transition in Bangladesh following Sheikh Hasina's departure in 2024, political turbulence in the Maldives, and persistent instability in Myanmar have all required rapid diplomatic adaptation. China's infrastructure projects are often faster and less conditional than Indian or multilateral alternatives, giving them appeal among governments facing immediate development pressures. India's own bureaucratic and regulatory constraints slow project implementation. Nevertheless, the Neighbourhood First Policy has produced a more institutionalised, resource-intensive, and strategically coherent framework for regional engagement than any previous government, and the competition with China for regional influence has given India additional motivation to deepen its presence across every dimension - from infrastructure and energy to culture and security.