Changing International Political Order

Rise of Superpowers

The United States emerged from World War II as the strongest nation on earth - militarily victorious, economically thriving, and possessing a nuclear monopoly. Several long-term factors explain how the U.S. built a position of unprecedented hegemony :

The U.S. benefited immensely from its geography. Flanked by two oceans and peaceful neighbours, the American homeland was shielded from the devastation that ravaged Europe and Asia in two world wars. This security allowed the U.S. to develop a stable democracy and prosperous economy.

It also meant that when others were exhausted by conflict, the U.S. could intervene decisively. Indeed, the U.S. entered both the world wars late - once other powers were drained - ensuring victory at a lower cost. By 1945, the U.S. stood astride the world as the only major industrial economy not wrecked by bombing or occupation. It produced roughly half of global economic output and had the dominant navy controlling key sea-lanes.

As WWII ended, the U.S. leveraged its economic might to establish a new international financial order (the Bretton Woods system ). American loans and aid helped rebuild war-torn regions. The U.S. dollar - backed by vast gold reserves - became the world's principal reserve currency. The dollar's central role gave Washington enormous leverage - a point still holds.

The U.S. used its wartime military strength to create a permanent global military presence. After 1945, it established bases across Europe and Asia. USA also built treaty alliances : NATO in 1949 (securing Western Europe), and with Japan, Australia and New-Zealand in Asia.

Through these pacts, the U.S. effectively became the guarantor of security for many regions, stationing troops and committing to defence. This entrenched U.S. leadership over allies (who, as noted, "outsourced" much of their defence to Washington).

American ideals of freedom, democracy, and open enterprise had wide appeal, especially in contrast to totalitarian fascism or Stalinism. The U.S. presented itself as the champion of a "free world" - a self-image rooted in its concept of "Manifest Destiny" and reinforced by WWII's outcome.

Culturally, American products, Hollywood films, and later pop music became globally influential, bolstering U.S. soft power. Overall, many societies found aspects of the U.S. model attractive or at least aspirational.

Additionally, the U.S. benefited greatly from Soviet missteps. American strategists consciously aimed to strain USSR's - for example, by engaging it in an expensive arms race and keeping energy prices low to sap Soviet revenues.

The cumulative effect was to isolate and bankrupt the Soviet state, making the U.S. "victory" in the Cold War as much about the USSR collapsing under its own weight. As one wry saying has it, the U.S. didn't win the Cold War so much as the USSR lost it. The outcome left the U.S. standing tall as the sole superpower by 1991.

Cold War & Bipolarity

The Cold War was a protracted geopolitical and ideological rivalry between the United States (and its allies) and the Soviet Union (and its satellites) following World War II. However, even before WWII ended, mutual suspicions ran deep.

The U.S., emerging as a global power, was determined to prevent any rival from dominating Eurasia, while the USSR's was bent upon security-driven expansion in Eastern Europe. Ideologically, the United States championed liberal capitalism, and the Soviet Union promoted communism - each viewing the other's system as a threat to its way of life. Winston Churchill famously warned in 1946 of an "iron curtain" descending across Europe, dividing the free West from the communist East.

Origins of the Cold War

Thus, we can say that several early events cemented the Cold War divide:

As Nazi Germany fell, Stalin's forces occupied Eastern Europe and installed pro-Soviet regimes. This suggested an expanding communist sphere.

In response, the U.S. adopted containment as its grand strategy. The 1946 Long Telegram by U.S. diplomat George Kennan advised that the USSR viewed itself in perpetual conflict with capitalism, and his 1947 article 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct' (signed "X") called for "patient but firm and vigilant containment".

In 1947, with the Truman Doctrine , President Harry S. Truman established that the United States would provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces.

Further, the Marshall Plan (1948) proposed that the United States provide economic assistance to restore the economic infrastructure of postwar Europe. Under the initiative, billions of dollars were injected to rebuild (West) European economies - both to create a bulwark against communism and to expand U.S. influence. This linked Europe to the U.S. through trade and also made the dollar a global currency.

Although offered participation, the Soviet Union refused Plan benefits and also blocked benefits to Eastern Bloc countries. It came up with its own economic bloc (COMECON).

In addition to above developments, NATO was formed in April 1949 and the U.S. monopoly on atomic bombs ended when the USSR tested its first atomic weapon in August 1949 , intensifying security fears. The U.S. proposal for international control of atomic energy (the Baruch Plan, 1946) failed as the Soviets countered that the U.S. must disarm first. A nuclear arms race was underway (discussed later), which paradoxically would enforce caution: as theorist Kenneth Waltz observed, these superweapons "made Cold War cold" by deterring direct superpower war.

The blame for the Cold War still remains debated. Traditionalists argue Soviet aggression and expansionism caused the breakdown of relations. Revisionists fault the U.S., noting that Washington's drive for global markets and its aggressive policies (Truman Doctrine, NATO formation, etc.) provoked Soviet insecurity. Post-revisionists conclude that both sides contributed - an inevitable clash of two security-conscious superpowers whose interests and ideologies were incompatible.

Realists even suggest the conflict was structural : a power vacuum after WWII left two dominant states whose geopolitical imperatives doomed cooperation. In contrast, social constructivists contend the Cold War was not preordained - it resulted from mutual misperceptions and distrust that, with better diplomacy, might have been overcome.

Phases of the Cold War

Although "Cold" (no large-scale direct combat between the superpowers), the rivalry had distinct phases of intensity:

As the Iron Curtain solidified in Europe, the U.S. led the formation of NATO in 1949. The Soviets responded in 1955 by organizing the Warsaw Pact with their Eastern European satellites, formalizing a bipolar military standoff. In this, Germany became a focal point. The Berlin Wall was constructed in 1961 and stood as the Cold War's stark symbol until its fall in 1989.

During this period, the U.S. and USSR also competed for influence in the decolonizing Third World , For example, the Korean War (1950-53). In 1954, U.S. President Eisenhower articulated the Domino Theory , fearing if one country fell to communism, neighbours would follow. This rationale dragged the U.S. into Vietnam, where it waged a costly war (1955-1975) to prevent a communist takeover.

The early '60s brought the world perilously close to nuclear war. After the failed U.S.-backed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba (1961) and amidst American attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro, the Soviet Union in 1962 secretly deployed nuclear missiles to Cuba.

The resulting Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962) was the Cold War's most dangerous showdown - a 13-day confrontation that brought humanity to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. Ultimately, a deal was struck: the USSR withdrew the missiles, and the U.S. pledged not to invade Cuba (and secretly agreed to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey).

The mid-1960s through the 1970s saw a relative thaw. Détente , a French term for easing tensions, described the improved U.S.-Soviet relationship after two decades of high conflict. Several factors drove détente: the Cuban crisis shock, the exhausting quagmire of Vietnam (which eroded U.S. hegemony and gold reserves), and the Soviet desire to stabilize its sphere and economy.

In this phase, the key developments included: the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) banning nuclear tests in atmosphere, outer space and water. ; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, opened 1968) to prevent new nuclear states; and the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty ( SALT I , 1972) freezing strategic missile launchers.

Notably, the U.S. also opened relations with communist China (Nixon's 1972 visit) - a strategic "triangular diplomacy" to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. However, despite rhetoric the phase did not end the rivalry : proxy conflicts continued, and both sides still modernized arsenals. Détente was more a pause than a permanent peace, as events would show.

Détente collapsed at the end of the 1970s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was dubbed the "Brezhnev Doctrine" in action (Moscow's insistence on controlling its perimeter). The U.S., under President Ronald Reagan, responded with hardline policies. The early 1980s thus saw a "Second Cold War" - high tensions and rhetoric. During this phase, the superpowers engaged in intense proxy wars . The he U.S. armed Islamic mujahideen fighters against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The toll of the Afghan war, combined with an arms race at a time of economic stagnation, strained the Soviet system severely.

Is a Bipolar World More Stable than a Multipolar One?

Polarity refers to the number of great powers in the international system. Whether stability, meaning the absence of great power war, is better served by two poles or by several is one of the classic debates of IR, opened by two articles published in 1964.

• Kenneth Waltz, 'The Stability of a Bipolar World' (Daedalus, 1964): with only two great powers there are no peripheries, so each watches the other closely and responds to every change. Each balances mainly through its own internal effort rather than through unreliable allies, so defections do not shake the system. Threats are clear, miscalculation is less likely, and the recurrent crises of a bipolar world act as a substitute for war. Waltz developed the argument in Theory of International Politics (1979).
• Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, 'Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability' (World Politics, 1964): a multipolar system offers more partners for interaction and more cross-cutting ties, so hostility towards any one state is diluted. Each state can give only part of its attention to any one rival, which dampens arms races, and flexible alignments allow aggression to be balanced.
• Later contributions: Richard Rosecrance proposed 'bi-multipolarity' as a mix of the two. John Lewis Gaddis called the Cold War the 'Long Peace' because no great power war occurred between 1945 and 1989. John Mearsheimer, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), argued that multipolarity is more war-prone than bipolarity and that unbalanced multipolarity, with a potential hegemon, is the most dangerous of all. William Wohlforth ('The Stability of a Unipolar World', 1999) argued that unipolarity is the most stable configuration.

The historical record is mixed. The multipolar European system after 1815 enjoyed long periods of peace but also produced two world wars, while the bipolar Cold War avoided great power war but saw proxy wars across the Third World, from Korea and Vietnam to Angola and Afghanistan. Many scholars attribute the Long Peace as much to nuclear deterrence as to bipolarity.

Developing countries see clear benefits in a multipolar world. It limits the unilateralism of a single superpower, seen in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, widens the room for strategic autonomy, offers alternative sources of finance, technology and markets, and gives middle powers and the Global South a greater voice in global governance. India seeks a multipolar world and a multipolar Asia, and its multi-alignment with the United States, Russia, the European Union and the Gulf states is designed for such an order. The danger is that a multipolar world without strong institutions may become more unpredictable and harder to manage.

Arms Race & Nuclear Threat

An arms race is a competitive buildup of military capabilities between states (or groups of states), each seeking security or advantage by outpacing the other. Throughout history, arms races have been a recurring phenomenon - from the naval arms race between Britain and Germany before World War I to the nuclear arms race of the Cold War. They are driven by the security dilemma : one state's attempt to increase its security (by arming) makes others feel less secure, prompting them to arm in response, leading to a spiral of accumulation.

Arms races are often viewed negatively, as they can be wasteful and heighten the risk of war. Competing states pour huge sums into weapons that might never be used except to deter each other. This diverts resources from social needs; for developing countries, importing arms can accumulate debt without productive payoff. The Soviet Union's economic difficulties in the 1980s were "certainly exacerbated" by the very high share of GDP devoted to the arms race with the U.S.. Additionally, when adversaries rapidly arm, mistrust deepens, making diplomatic solutions harder.

There is debate on whether arms races cause war . Intuitively, arms buildups create fear and worst-case assumptions; However, it may also be the case that underlying rivalry lead to both arms races and war, rather than the arms race itself triggering a war.

On contrary, arms race can also be a deterrent to war. For example, the Cold War nuclear arms race did not lead to direct superpower war - arguably because the fear of what those arms could do ( mutual annihilation ) acted as a brake on aggression.

Thus, some scholars argue arms races under certain conditions can stabilize a rivalry by ensuring deterrence. This was essentially Waltz's view: nuclear arms, by raising the cost of war unimaginably high, kept the peace between the U.S. and USSR.

In contrast, conventional arms races lack that absolute deterrence and may encourage one side to strike first if it believes it has gained a temporary edge.

Economically, arms spending can have some short-term benefits like job creation in defence industries or push technological innovation. But beyond a point, it's a zero-sum game if rivals just offset each other. Nations not only risk bankrupting themselves (as the USSR effectively did), but also if they "win" the race by causing an opponent's collapse (like the U.S. vis-à-vis USSR), they might inherit new problems, e.g. in Indo Pak arms race, Pak is essentially turning towards a failed state and there is grave danger of nuclear weapons falling in hands of non-state actors. Thus, arms control is generally seen as desirable to avoid unchecked arms races, but it requires mutual trust, hard to come by between adversaries.

The end of the Cold War briefly raised hopes of a "peace dividend" and an end to arms racing. Indeed, military budgets dropped in the 1990s and the total number of nuclear weapons worldwide fell by over 75% from Cold War highs. However, the 21st century has seen a reemergence of arms competition on multiple fronts:

Contemporary Arms Races

In 2019, the U.S. (under Trump) left the INF Treaty, accusing Russia of violating it with a new intermediate-range cruise missile. The last remaining pact, New START (2010), which limited deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 each and was extended once to 2026, expired on 5 February 2026 with no replacement treaty, amid tensions after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Both countries are modernizing their nuclear triads - the U.S. with a planned $1.2 trillion, 30-year overhaul, and Russia with new ICBMs, nuclear-powered cruise missiles, and upgraded nuclear submarines etc. While numbers are far below Cold War levels, the emphasis is now on quality and diversification of nuclear systems. The danger is a new arms race in destabilizing technologies, with reduced transparency.

During the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR tried to constrain nuclear proliferation - hence treaties like the NPT. Still, other countries acquired nukes: Britain, France, and China, and outside the NPT, Israel, India, South Africa (which later dismantled its arsenal), and Pakistan all developed weapons. Post-Cold War, North Korea joined the nuclear club (first test in 2006).

Today r egional arms races exist: India and Pakistan have an action-reaction cycle in South Asia, with India's larger military spurring Pakistan to develop nuclear tactical weapons and increase its warhead count. India's quest for a credible nuclear triad - it has deployed its first ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant ) and advanced delivery systems (like the Agni-V ICBM) is partly driven by China's arsenal, not just Pakistan.

Meanwhile, China's nuclear expansion has accelerated; it is "fast developing short and medium range missiles" and moving toward a larger deterrent, perhaps aiming for 1000 warheads by 2030. This means a trilateral nuclear arms competition (U.S.-Russia-China) is emerging, which is harder to manage since Cold War arms control was bilateral.

Thus, we face a multipolar nuclear arms race : three great powers modernizing arsenals, plus regional players adding capabilities. This raises complexities - e.g. U.S. missile defences built against North Korea also worry China and Russia; India's buildup to deter China affects Pakistan's sense of security, and so on.

While the U.S. has maintained a lead in conventional weapons, others are catching up or pioneering new areas. For instance, anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) have been tested by the U.S., Russia, China, and India - raising the prospect of a race to weaponize space. Cyber warfare capabilities are a major new arena, though harder to quantify as an "arms race," nations are certainly in a race for cyber offensive and defensive prowess. Artificial Intelligence and autonomous weapons (e.g. drone swarms) could also become a race if countries believe AI will confer a military edge. Unlike nukes, these areas currently lack arms control regimes, so it's a free-for-all.

After a post-Cold War low in the 1990s, global military expenditure has steadily risen and now exceeds Cold War levels in constant dollars.

The United States still far outspends any other, larger than the next 9 countries combined. China 's military budget has increased more than tenfold since 1990. India and others have also increased spending. Regions like East Asia are now engaged in an arms buildup.

While the Cold War arms race is over, we now have a complex set of arms races - more regional and multi-dimensional. They involve not just two superpowers but multiple actors and technologies. The lessons of the past suggest that arms races, if left unchecked, can lead to insecurity spirals and potentially war by miscalculation. Conversely, the Cold War also showed that diplomacy can mitigate arms races . The challenge today is achieving agreements in a more fragmented power structure, and on new frontiers of warfare, before competition escalates into conflict.

Why Nations Seek Nuclear Weapons

Ever since atomic bombs were first used in 1945, the world has grappled with the nuclear question : Why do nations acquire nuclear weapons and what are the implications for international security? This topic has inspired a rich body of theory, from realist arguments about deterrence to liberal emphasis on institutions to constructivist focus on norms.

The most straightforward purpose is to deter existential threats. Realist scholars argue states seek nukes when they face a significant security challenge. For example, the Soviet Union pursued nukes to negate the U.S. advantage; Britain and France developed them to ensure an independent deterrent. China did so after facing both U.S. and Soviet pressure in the 1960s.

In more recent times, India's nuclear quest was driven by security concerns vis-à-vis China (after Indo China 1962 war and Chinese nuclear test of 1964) and later Pakistan, while Pakistan's program was a direct response to India's nuclear tests.

Israel is believed to have built nukes to guarantee its survival against numerically superior Arab neighbours. North Korea offers a textbook case: facing the U.S. military presence in South Korea and hostile regional environment, it saw nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor against regime change.

Nukes can confer a sense of great-power status. France's Charles de Gaulle famously said that "nuclear weapons were necessary for France to count in world affairs". Emerging powers may see them as tickets to the top table. It relates to the idea that with nuclear capability comes more influence or at least insurance of sovereignty.

Scholars like Scott Sagan point out that military-scientific bureaucracies can also push for nuclear acquisition.

Further,if a country loses faith that its ally's nuclear umbrella will protect it, it might seek its own bomb. Today, some speculate that if U.S. security guarantees to countries like South Korea or Turkey waver, those countries might contemplate nuclear options themselves.

Many countries capable of developing nukes chose not to because they rely on allies. States like Japan, South Korea, and Australia live under the U.S. nuclear umbrella , removing their need to proliferate.

The NPT created a strong non-proliferation norm . Countries that considered the bomb often faced global opprobrium and sanctions (e.g., South Africa in the apartheid era, or more recently Iran). Nina Tannenwald refers to a " nuclear taboo " - a normative inhibition not just on use but even on brandishing nuclear weapons as normal instruments of policy. This stigma can deter leaders from pursuing the bomb if they want international acceptance.

Nuclear weapons programs are expensive and technically challenging. Countries need not only fissile material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) but also know-how for weaponization and delivery systems, which may require years of testing. For smaller economies, this can be a huge burden and divert funds from development.

Sometimes individual leaders can make a call to stop nuclear programs due to changing threat perceptions or other considerations. E.g., Libyan leader Gaddafi agreed in 2003 to dismantle nuclear program to normalize relations with the West. However, this example later gave North Korea an opposite lesson when Gaddafi was toppled without a deterrent.

Coercion

In some cases, countries were prevented from getting nukes by outside force or covert action. Iraq's weapons program was halted by Israel's 1981 airstrike on Osirak and later by the 1991 Gulf War and UN inspections. Syria's suspected reactor was bombed by Israel in 2007.

Waltz contends that nuclear weapons are a force for peace. He argues that when states go nuclear, war... He argues that when states go nuclear, the risk of major war between them plummets because neither will want to court its own destruction.

Fellow realist John Mearsheimer agrees but with a caveat: he supports selective proliferation - believing it's stabilizing for mature democracies to have nukes, but dangerous in the hands of unstable regimes.

Sagan strongly contests the nuclear optimism. He argues that while nuclear deterrence in theory makes war irrational, in practice human and organizational failures make nuclear use possible. Military organizations, he notes, have inherent biases and favour offensive doctrines in crises.

Sagan points to historical near-misses (like the Cuban Missile Crisis) as evidence that deterrence has come close to failing - not by deliberate choice of leaders but by misperceptions and military pressure for advantage.

Thus, Sagan concludes there is a significant probability that given enough time and more nuclear actors, deterrence will fail somewhere, resulting in nuclear war or an accident. He therefore advocates strong non-proliferation efforts and tight control of existing arsenals.

Tannenwald shifts the focus to the power of norms and ethics . She argues that a "nuclear taboo" - an informal but powerful global norm -developed against the use of nuclear weapons. Leaders have come to see nukes as abhorrent options, not just ordinary military tools. This taboo, in her assessment, significantly contributed to the 77-plus year tradition of non-use since 1945.

However, she warns against complacency: just because the worst-case (nuclear war) hasn't happened yet "does not mean it will not materialize" . If norms erode or states grow careless, we could still "slip into nuclear war because of our carelessness".

Tannenwald is a proponent of efforts to delegitimize nuclear weapons - for instance, she praises the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (ban treaty) as a grassroots initiative that reframes nukes as unacceptable on humanitarian grounds. Such movements, in her view will strengthen the taboo and push nuclear states toward disarmament over time.

Non-Proliferation Regime

After the shock of early proliferation, the world developed a series of treaties and institutions to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Below are key components of this nuclear security architecture.

Widely considered the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, the NPT rests on a central bargain with three pillars:

• Non-proliferation - non-nuclear states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons;
• Disarmament - nuclear-armed states (the P5 recognized in the treaty: US, USSR/Russia, UK, France, China) pledge to pursue disarmament;
• Peaceful use - all states can access nuclear technology for energy/medicine under safeguards.

The treaty has 191 state parties (near universal membership). Only five countries are outside it: India, Pakistan, and Israel never joined (each developed nuclear weapons), and North Korea joined but withdrew in 2003 to test bombs. South Sudan, as a new state, has not joined yet but presumably will.

The NPT was made permanent in 1995 (it was originally 25-year duration).

• Non-nuclear states criticize that the NPT discriminates : it divided the world into nuclear "haves" (the P5) and "have-nots.
• The treaty's disarmament pillar is seen as weak - there's no timeline for nuclear disarmament, only a vague obligation to negotiate in good faith. Decades on, the P5 still collectively retain thousands of warheads.
• Moreover, the NPT's allowance of peaceful nuclear technology is a loophole : countries can develop enrichment or reprocessing under safeguards, then potentially leave the treaty and quickly weaponize (as North Korea did).

Despite these issues, the NPT's near universality makes it indispensable part of global nuclear security architecture.

Though established in 1957 (before NPT), the IAEA became the watchdog for NPT compliance.

It implements safeguards agreements - essentially inspecting civil nuclear facilities to ensure no diversion of nuclear material to weapons. The IAEA can monitor uranium mines, enrichment plants, reactors, and waste processing in non-nuclear weapon states. If it finds evidence of cheating (as it did with Iran in 2003 or Libya in 2004), it can refer the case to the UN Security Council. IAEA also promotes peaceful nuclear applications.

A major innovation was the Additional Protocol (1997) - a voluntary enhancement that gives IAEA inspectors more access for inspection. Many states have adopted it, improving the agency's ability to catch clandestine programs.

The IAEA has had successes (uncovering Saddam's 1990s secret nuclear work after the Gulf War, verifying South Africa's disarmament or policing the Iran Deal until 2018) and failures (it did not detect North Korea's cheating in the 1990s until the country almost finished a bomb, largely because its access was limited).

Overall, it's a linchpin of the architecture - without IAEA verification, treaties would lack trust. However, the agency depends on state cooperation and intelligence tips, and it has no enforcement power itself (only the UNSC can impose penalties for non-compliance).

To reinforce non-proliferation and keep entire regions free of nuclear arms, several treaties establish NWFZs. These include:

Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) for Latin America and Caribbean; Treaty of Rarotonga (1985) for South Pacific; Bangkok (1995) for Southeast Asia; Pelindaba (1996) for Africa; and Central Asia NWFZ (2006) . In total, over 100 countries belong to such zones, covering almost the entire Southern Hemisphere and more. Parties commit not to manufacture or host nuclear weapons. These zones have helped solidify regional norms against nuclear arms.

One gap is the Middle East - efforts for a Middle East NWFZ (or Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone) have stalled for decades due to the Israel-Iran dilemma. Nonetheless, NWFZs are an important part of the architecture as they regionalize non-proliferation commitments.

Beyond treaties, supplier nations coordinate to control the spread of nuclear materials and technology.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) , formed in 1975 after India's test, is a 48-nation group that sets guidelines for nuclear exports to prevent assisting weapons development.

The NSG operates by consensus. The NSG has been effective in tightening the screws on proliferators; for example, when NSG members cut off supply, it's hard for a rogue state to get specialized items for enrichment or reactors.

However, the NSG faces a quandary with India. In 2008, the NSG granted India a unique waiver to engage in nuclear trade despite not being an NPT member, after India agreed to certain non-proliferation commitments. China has since blocked India's full membership, tying it to Pakistan's case.

Test Ban and Disarmament Treaties

There are also the other agreements that complement nuclear export controls.

• Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) ,
• Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional arms and dual-use goods), and
• Australia Group (chemical/biological weapons)

India joined the MTCR in 2016, which China hasn't - giving India leverage (India could potentially veto China's admission)

The PTBT was one of the first major international treaties aimed at curbing the nuclear arms race. Signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater - effectively banning all but underground testing.

While it did not halt the qualitative arms race (as underground tests continued), it was symbolically important in acknowledging the environmental and public health consequences of radioactive fallout.

India was among the original signatories of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), ratifying it in October 1963.

This 1996 treaty aims to ban all nuclear testing for both civilian and military purposes. It has a sweeping verification regime (a global network of seismic and other sensors to detect blasts).

Despite signed by many countries, CTBT is not in force as nine specific nations have not ratified the treaty.

• U.S., Russia and China (signed but not ratified)
• Israel, Iran, Egypt (signed but not ratified).
• India (not signed),
• Pakistan and North Korea (not signed),

Despite not being in force, the CTBT has established a strong norm against nuclear testing. Technologically, the P5 now use simulation techniques for nuclear testing.

One of India's critiques was that CTBT wasn't truly "comprehensive" since it doesn't stop lab simulations by the advanced powers). India famously said in 1996 it would not sign a treaty that perpetuated unequal access to improvement.

"India will not sign this unequal treaty. Not now, not ever." - Ambassador Arundhati Ghose in 1996.

It is also suggested that today that India could reconsider joining the CTBT since it has finished necessary testing and has acquired simulation capability.

The CTBT's stalemate largely hinges on the U.S. Senate's refusal to ratify (it was rejected in 1999). If the U.S. ratified, pressure would mount on other states to follow.

This proposed treaty would ban production of fissile material (plutonium and highly-enriched uranium) for weapons. It has been discussed for decades but talks have been stalled - chiefly due to Pakistan's objections.

An FMCT is essentially a cap on nuclear arsenals: nuclear states could keep their current warheads but not make new bomb material, meaning over time arsenals could only decline. Pakistan worries because it has less fissile material in stock than India.

Thus, in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which operates by consensus, Pakistan has vetoed moving forward. Meanwhile, India, China, and Pakistan continue producing fissile material (the P5 have mostly stopped, having large reserves).

An FMCT would clearly benefit global security by preventing arms race. Notably, India is formally committed to an FMCT as part of the 2008 Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal. The FMCT's fate is uncertain, but it remains a key missing piece of the architecture for capping arms competition among nuclear states.

Frustrated by slow disarmament, non-nuclear states and civil society negotiated this treaty to outright ban nuclear weapons. It prohibits developing, testing, possessing, using, or threatening to use nuclear weapons. The TPNW entered into force in 2021 after 50 ratifications. However, no nuclear-armed state or their close allies have joined .

The nuclear powers argue the ban treaty is unrealistic - it doesn't account for security conditions and could undermine the NPT by creating parallel norms.

Over 65 countries have now ratified TPNW. Its impact so far is normative: it seeks to further stigmatize nuclear arms and rally global public opinion for disarmament.

India's official stance is that it supports the goal of a nuclear-free world but sees the ban treaty process as bypassing the consensus-based approach and lacking the involvement of nuclear states.

From a high of 70,000 active weapons in 1986, as of 2024 there are approximately 4,000 active nuclear warheads and 12,000 total nuclear warheads in the world. That reduction is a triumph of arms control and geopolitical change.

Yet, a worrying trend is the erosion of arms control agreements in recent years. The U.S.-Russia antagonism (especially after the Ukraine war) has ended almost all bilateral dialogue on strategic stability. Meanwhile, modernization programs proceed: the nuclear powers are all upgrading or expanding (China notably increasing its warhead count, possibly toward 1000 by 2030).

There's also the threat of nuclear terrorism - nuclear weapons, getting in hands of terrorists. So far, no terrorist group has obtained a nuclear weapon. Still, security of stockpiles (especially in Pakistan or with Russia's large inventory) remains a concern.

The architecture has so far prevented uncontrolled proliferation. But the system faces strains: geopolitical rivalry is rising, and arms control has stagnated. Revitalizing this framework - through new treaties or reaffirming existing ones - will be crucial to avoid backsliding into a more dangerous nuclear order.

Non-Aligned Movement

Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) was the movement of third-world countries that emerged after the 2nd WW. The movement primarily focused on preserving the newly earned freedom and sovereignty of these countries. During the early days, its actions were key factors in the process of decolonization. And it has played an important role in preserving world peace and security.

According to Prof. T V Paul, McGill University, the Non-Alignment Movement is an example of 'soft balancing' by weaker states towards great powers. As these countries had little material ability to constrain superpower conflict and arms race, they adopted the method of soft balancing through normative power. Normative power denotes a new set of values like peace, disarmament, development, autonomy of choice and the new world order.

Origins and Evolution

Bandung Asian-African conference in 1955 is considered as most immediate antecedent to the creation of NAM. The meeting was attended by 29 Heads of states belonging to the first post-colonial generation. The objective was to identify and assess world issues and pursue joint policies in international relations. However, there was also another important reason. These countries had newly attained independence. Development and increasing standard of living was the main concern for them. Thus, they did not want to be part of either the Western or Eastern block and get dragged into the cold war.

The 'Ten Principles of Bandung' were proclaimed at the conference. Such principles were later adopted as the main goals and objectives of NAM.

Six years after Bandung, the Movement of Non-Aligned countries was founded at the First Summit Conference of Belgrade, on Sep 1-6, 1961. The conference was attended by members of 25 countries from Asia, Africa Europe, and Latin America (Cuba). The newly created grouping, NAM was declared as a 'movement' and not an organization to avoid the bureaucratic implications of the latter. Further, the word 'movement' denotes the dynamism and the ever-evolving agenda in response to the global world order. The NAM was conceived to play an active role in international politics and to have its own stand on international matters. Which will reflect the interest of its members.

At present, the membership of NAM includes 121 member states (South Sudan joined in 2024) and 20 observer states along with the participation of 10 international organisations. The below map shows the members and observer states of NAM.

Since its inception, the NAM meetings have been held every three years. The latest Summits being the 2016 Venezuela Summit, the 2019 Azerbaijan (Baku) Summit and the 19th Summit, held at Kampala, Uganda, in January 2024 after being postponed from 2022. Meanwhile, a virtual NAM summit was held online on 4 May 2020 titled "United Against COVID-19".

The Primary objective of NAM focused on the support of self-determination, national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, opposition to apartheid, non-adherence to multilateral military pacts, struggle against imperialism and colonialism, racism, foreign occupation etc. Strengthening of United Nations, democratization of International Relations, socio-economic development as well as international cooperation on equal footing.

In the 1950s the movement played an important role in support of nations struggling for independence and against colonization. Third World showed great solidarity under the leadership of NAM and the movement gained considerable diplomatic prestige.

In the 1960s and 70s , the movement expanded to include nearly all Asian and African countries. The issues raised by the movement also evolved. It now included the struggle for the respect of economic and political rights of third-world countries. The Algiers conference in 1973 launched the concept of the 'New International Economic Order' (NIEO). The new order was proposed in the context of neo-colonialism, the drain of wealth from peripheries to the core (dependency theory).

Thus, the agenda of NAM was to

• Impose responsibilities on MNCs.
• Better valuation of the goods exported by developing countries, and
• Pressurising Western countries to transfer funds and technology.

Relevance and Critiques

Unfortunately, there was no outcome. There was a lack of solidarity among third-world countries. Western countries were successful in creating geopolitical conflicts among third-world countries. Further, the proposals were also utopian. It was not possible to get equal value to the raw materials and manufactured goods. It was an attempt to apply socialism in international trade. Although inspired by the Oil diplomacy of OPEC countries, the NAM didn't have similar bargaining power, nor could it get the OPEC countries on board with its agenda.

By end of 1980s, the world observed the end of Cold War and collapse of the Socialist Block. It was assumed that the bipolar world order was the prime reason for NAM, and therefore scholars started asking questions about the relevance of movement. Some of the member countries like Egypt proposed the dissolution of NAM. Yugoslavia, one of the founding member, disintegrated and NAM countries played no role in handling the crisis. Further, NAM countries had no position on the issue of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, both of whom were NAM members. Thus, it is said that since the end of Cold War, NAM has been in search of the agenda.

Prof. Hans Koechler , a leading expert on NAM suggests that "NAM is not relevant today, it was relevant only during the Cold War era Bi-polar world. Now there is only one dominant global power (the U.S.) and in this unipolar world, NAM has lost its relevance. Further, since most of the NAM countries are heavily dependent on the US, it does not really leave them non-aligned.

The most significant case against NAM is that the cold war has ended and so has NAM's raison d'etre. There is no more fear of two military blocs possibly destroying the world in the heat of the moment. The military blocs like SEATO, CENTO and Warsaw have become redundant and tumbled down. moreover, Military bases have become a thing of the past owing to advances in science and technology and its use for military purposes. The most crucial part of NAM's agenda was that of pushing for the decolonization of all the colonized countries. As this task has been achieved there seems no reason to continue with the NAM.

Today the NAM is not in a position to act even as a forum for displaying solidarity. The NAM has no charter and there are no strict rules on whether the member countries have to defend each other's actions. Today, the NAM competes with similar international organisations like the G-7, ASEAN, and the Commonwealth. However, due to the fact that they focus on business and trade, other organisations are more productive. This is not something the NAM does, nor does it engage in any diplomatic activity.

NAM has no actual issues either. Along with other social and economic challenges, it may have shown some leadership in the areas of nuclear nonproliferation, child labour, poverty, and terrorism. To be able to continue to have an impact on global politics, NAM urgently needs fresh topics and themes to concentrate on. If not, it will be yet another pointless conference. NAM has failed to make any progress even on issues where there is general agreement, like the drug trade, international terrorism, and non-proliferation.

According to Jagat S. Mehta , a former Indian Foreign Secretary; NAM was started to advocate for the independent rights of nations and that has been achieved, hence, the mission should be declared accomplished and NAM should be discontinued.

Dr. S. Jaishankar recently said that NAM was an idea born in a particular temporality, and believes that India, taking the concept of independence of action from NAM, should move beyond it to respond efficiently to contemporary developments.

According to C Rajamohan , an Indian academic and foreign policy analyst, the end of Cold War was the best time for a graceful exit from a platform that had no achievement in the past and no prospects in future. It was the best time as the NAM issue had taken the credit of ending the Cold War. NAM countries should have declared the 'mission accomplished', and disbanded it. Now, the movement is in a coma. NAM was irrelevant even before the end of the Cold War. After the Cold War, it was put into a coma because countries were not ready for its burial. They prefer to maintain the triennial rituals.

According to Prof. T V Paul, NAM never got the credit it deserved. There has been an intellectual bias against NAM. Despite all criticism, NAM acted as a limited soft-balancing mechanism. It has used 'naming and shaming' tools against great powers. The intellectual bias against NAM, a coalition of weaker states is as natural and expected as there is a bias against the subaltern class movements among upper classes and upper castes in hierarchical societies.

While it is easy to dismiss the NAM as redundant, it is also important to note that it is the biggest organization exclusively of third-world countries. In the dynamics of international relations, it is not possible to predict when the need will arise to revive it. Since its formation, NAM has maintained its regular schedule of summits. Moreover, the steadily growing memberships of NAM have eliminated all doubts as to the relevance of the NAM.

However, this increasing number is also a bane to the organisation as it is turning NAM into a club where one can discuss and debate international issues rather than resolve them. The summit declarations don't include anything particular that suggests the movement is really grappling with the problems caused by a unipolar strategy intended to retain the North's hegemony over the South. Most importantly, the NAM's progress towards its two primary and consistent goals, the development of the third world and the eradication of poverty, continues to lag behind.

Despite the fact that the bipolar world has ended, Washington should not become the political Mecca for individuals who had shied away from aligning themselves with either of the two blocs. It is clear that the assertion that "NAM is dead", actively promoted by some Western commentators is nothing less than a canard. A severely Euro-Center-centric international political landscape characterises the current unipolar world and is becoming increasingly featureless. The NAM, which saw the transition of the world from bipolar to unipolar and now a multipolar one, is possibly more important now than it has ever been in the history of international relations and development.

The end of one block has not done away with the problems of the world. New issues like terrorism and climate change have emerged which necessitate global coordination.

Today, more than ever, NAM has a plethora of work to do. It has to set up a new international order through the UN, restructure and democratize the UN; enhance South-South cooperation and coordination with the G-77; foster cooperation in the areas of food cooperation, population, trade and investment; ensure equitable international flow of trade and transfer of technology; and oppose interventionism and imposition of economic conditions on developing countries. Given that more than half of the world still suffers from the issues relevant to NAM, it is pointless to question the relevance of the same. As diplomat N. Krishnan reminds us, "dynamics of globalization have produced a whole set of new problems which the Non-Alignment Movement must take note of."

According to T V Paul, there is a space for the resurrection of the old movement as a soft balancing mechanism against powerful states. As great powers are once again in the arms race, militarization of oceans and territorial expansions, there is a need for weaker countries to come together to delegitimize imperial ventures. If third-world countries do not act as cushioning forces, international order will spiral into a hot war. Great powers always need to be restrained and balanced. Soft balancing by smaller states has a key role to play because military conflicts will ultimately bring suffering to them. There is a need to revive the 'Bandung' spirit. There is no hope from China and India to revive the movement because they are in the race of superstardom. The onus is on smaller countries.

India and NAM

India is a founding member of the NAM. And since its birth NAM has been playing a very active role in fostering cooperation among nations, particularly among developing countries. India has felt it useful to continue to support and actively engage with the movement because it has provided a high profile and strong voice to India in international fora and affairs.

After the disintegration of USSR, the then Indian PM PV Narasimha Rao had laid out the vision for NAM. In his words, "the main concern of NAM is not related to superpower rivalry, rather it is to give voice and address concerns of third world countries."

If India has the ambition to play a major role in the global economy, it must necessarily think of taking the leadership of the Non-aligned while taking into account the norms of international relations. NAM provides a basis to build India's soft power and even at present India needs third world solidarity.

Especially, after the Covid-19 pandemic, India and most third-world countries have realised the need for solidarity against powerful institutions to avail even the basic necessities like healthcare. India's Prime Minister, Mr Modi, also participated in the virtual NAM summit in 2020 and called NAM 'the moral voice' of the world. Moreover, in the emerging cold war between the US and China, it will be in favour of India to hold the leadership position in the Global South.

According to T P Srinivasan , NAM did benefit India because it allowed to promote our national interest as per our preferences, NAM has allowed India to manage through the situation of bipolarity. The movement is still relevant for India and India has stakes in the integrity of NAM. India has to seek partnerships with the countries so that it is able to exercise its freedom of thought and action, away from the influence of great powers like the US, Russia and China.

Martand Jha suggests that whether NAM is relevant for India or not depends on the prism through which we look at NAM. It would be a mistake if we just see NAM as a rejection of block politics. NAM was a policy for autonomy, to establish peace and security, and to contain the superpower's hegemonic ambitions. Thus NAM needs to be reinvented. It is the biggest platform for developing countries outside United Nations. It provides a platform for the natural leadership of India. However, India needs to provide a concrete program of action, goals and leadership.

C Rajamohan , as quoted earlier, suggests that NAM was never relevant for India. NAM countries never supported India e.g. In the 1962 war, countries like Indonesia, and Ghana took a pro-China approach. NAM countries gave Colombo proposals that were favourable to China. In the 1965 war, NAM countries like Indonesia not only supported Pakistan but even supplied weapons to Pakistan. 1971 war, NAM countries of West Asia, South Asia, and South East Asia fiercely supported Pakistan and Sri Lanka provided re-fuelling to the Pakistani aircraft.

The time is ripe to evaluate the past and formulate future policies for the Non-aligned countries to change the existing international order. None of the NAM countries or groups of countries, however, big or rich they may be, can face these new realities alone. Hence, the countries of NAM must continue to stay and act together for common thought and action.

This means that the unidimensional and unipolar version of the new international system needs to be contested by the NAM as a whole. Unity and solidarity among the Non-aligned countries are all the more necessary in the present crisis in international relations.

The realities of current politics make non-alignment equally relevant today for the developing countries of the world as it was during the Cold War period. In the words of former Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, "Nonalignment basically consists of the espousal of the right of nations to independence and development, regardless of the bloc phenomenon. Whether there is one bloc or more at a given moment, the urge for a nonaligned country would continue to be to maintain its independence, to take decisions according to its light, not tagging along itself, in advance to others."

The movement has succeeded in creating a strong front representing countries of the third world. Current challenges for NAM include protecting international law, eliminating weapons of mass destruction, making the United Nations more effective, defending human rights, security, stability and justice in the international economic system. The long-standing goals of peace, development, and economic cooperation, remain to be realized. Thus we can expect the movement to play an even bigger role in coming times.

Collapse of USSR

A dramatic turnaround came with Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985. Gorbachev sought to reform the Soviet system (through glasnost openness and perestroika restructuring) and realized that easing Cold War tensions was necessary for internal revival.

He engaged in unprecedented summits with U.S. President Reagan, signing the INF Treaty (1987) to eliminate an entire class of medium-range nuclear missiles. Gorbachev also announced the "Sinatra Doctrine," letting Warsaw Pact states "do it their way".

The result was swift: in 1989, communist regimes collapsed across Eastern Europe (the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, symbolizing the Cold War's demise). Gorbachev refused to send in Soviet tanks to stop these revolutions.

The Cold War formally ended with the Malta Summit in December 1989, where Gorbachev and U.S. President George H.W. Bush declared an end to hostilities. By December 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved into 15 independent states, marking the end of the bipolar era.

Legacy and Aftermath

Despite the superpower standoff, the period saw transformative global changes during Cold War. The colonial empires in Asia and Africa collapsed - dozens of new nation-states emerged as the European powers withdrew. These newly independent countries often became pawns or players in the Cold War. Many joined the India led Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to avoid choosing sides. The Cold War's pressures also accelerated European integration in the West (culminating in the European Economic Community, the precursor to today's EU) as Western Europe sought unity and strength under U.S. protection. Technological competition surged - the superpowers' space race put Sputnik and then Apollo astronauts into space, dramatically advancing science and technology. Culturally, the rivalry shaped everything from Olympic sports to art and propaganda.

The 45-year conflict left a profound imprint on international order:

Nuclear Arms Race and Arms Control: The superpowers amassed tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, leading to a precarious balance of terror ( MAD - Mutually Assured Destruction). This arms race spurred the creation of global arms control regimes (NPT, SALT, etc.) to prevent catastrophe.

Military Blocs and Militarization: The world divided into rival blocs (NATO vs Warsaw Pact), and even formally neutral states often tilted toward one side or the other. Massive military expenditures were incurred; at one point the USSR devoted an estimated 15-20% of its GDP to defence. This prolonged militarization had negative economic effects - indeed, the Soviet Union's eventual collapse was partly due to the unsustainable burden of the arms race.

Proxy Wars and Instability in the Developing World: The Third World became a chessboard for proxy conflicts - from Korea and Vietnam to Angola, Afghanistan, and Central America. Many of these wars were devastating for the local populations and left legacies of instability.

Paralysis of the United Nations: The UN Security Council, with both the U.S. and USSR holding vetoes, was often deadlocked and ineffective in major crises. Superpower rivalry stymied collective security except when interests aligned.

Economic and Technological Competition: The Cold War split the world economy. The West experienced unprecedented growth under U.S.-led institutions (IMF, World Bank, GATT), while the Eastern bloc had a closed, centrally planned economy. Technologically, competition (especially the space race and defence research) led to breakthroughs (satellites, computing, etc.), but also huge expenditures on unproductive capacities like warheads.

Stability (the "Long Peace"): Paradoxically, some scholars argue the Cold War imposed a grim stability on great-power relations. With two superpowers checking each other, large-scale wars (like the World Wars) did not recur. Nuclear deterrence forced caution - direct U.S.-Soviet clashes were avoided for fear of Armageddon. As John Lewis Gaddis dubbed it, the post-1945 era was a "Long Peace" among major powers, albeit shadowed by the constant risk of annihilation.

Other consequences: When the Cold War ended, the global landscape changed swiftly. The immediate aftermath was a unipolar world with the United States as the lone superpower. There was optimism about a liberal "New World Order" under U.S. leadership and a reinvigorated UN.

However, some observers note that the end of the East-West ideological clash gave way to Samuel Huntington's predicted " clash of civilizations " - with cultural and religious conflicts coming to the fore. The 1990s also saw the rise of non-state actors - from terrorist groups like al-Qaeda to multinational corporations - gaining influence in a more interconnected, unipolar world. Meanwhile, the Non-Aligned Movement struggled to redefine itself in a world no longer split between two blocs.

American Unipolarity

By the 1990s, American hegemony appeared nearly unchallenged. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama went so far as to dub it "the end of history," with liberal democracy and U.S.-led order as the final paradigm.

US enjoyed hegemony almost since end of 2 nd world war. However, since the late 2000s, commentators have increasingly described U.S. hegemony as in relative decline. Key challenges include:

It all started with the events of 9/11. The attacks on American soil in 2001 provoked an immediate and strong response. The U.S. launched the Global War on Terror, beginning with the invasion of Afghanistan to dismantle al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban. However, it soon turned into a long and costly entanglement.

The pursuit of regime change and state-building stretched U.S. resources and global goodwill. Over time, these interventions, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, exposed the limits of American military power, sapped economic strength, and created a growing perception that U.S. foreign policy was overextended and unsustainable.

The U.S. suffered serious economic setbacks, notably the 2008 financial crisis , which originated in Wall Street and shook confidence in the American-model of deregulated capitalism. The crisis inflicted lasting damage: sluggish growth and rising debt. Additionally, persistent trade deficits led to industrial decline, fuelling domestic discontent. The COVID-19 pandemic (2020) further hit U.S. prestige, as America's initially chaotic response contrasted with more efficient actions by others.

NATO, US Hegemony and Transactional Pressure

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created by the Washington Treaty of April 1949 as a collective defence alliance. Its core is Article 5, under which an armed attack on one member is treated as an attack on all, and Article 5 has been invoked only once, after the attacks of 11 September 2001. NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, is said to have described its purpose as keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down. After the Cold War it grew from 16 to 32 members, the latest being Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024), which joined after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

NATO as a tool of US hegemony. Critics argue that NATO is the principal instrument through which the United States has perpetuated its primacy in Europe and beyond:

• The United States supplies most of the alliance's military capability and its nuclear umbrella, and an American officer has always held the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
• Eastward expansion from 1999, despite Russian objections, carried the US sphere of influence to Russia's borders. Realists such as John Mearsheimer see this as a cause of the Ukraine crisis.
• Out-of-area operations in Kosovo (1999), without Security Council authorisation, in Afghanistan (2003-14) and in Libya (2011), where critics argue a mandate to protect civilians was stretched into regime change, show NATO acting beyond the defence of its members.
• Interoperability ties European militaries to American weapons, and the Madrid Strategic Concept of 2022 brought China onto the alliance's agenda as a source of systemic challenges.

Defenders reply that NATO is an 'empire by invitation', in Geir Lundestad's phrase, since its members chose to join and the states of Central and Eastern Europe sought membership as protection against Russia. Decisions are taken by consensus, and allies such as France and Turkey have often defied Washington. Liberals see NATO as a security community of democracies rather than an instrument of domination.

Transactional coercion under Trump. Donald Trump's second term has turned US support into a bargain. Trump has questioned whether the United States would defend allies that spend too little, and at the Hague summit of June 2025 allies agreed to raise defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP by 2035, at least 3.5 per cent on core defence and up to 1.5 per cent on related resilience and infrastructure, with Spain securing an exception. The dispute over Greenland went further. In January 2026 Trump threatened tariffs on eight European allies that opposed his demand for US control of the Danish territory, then withdrew the threat after announcing a 'framework' for a deal with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. An agreement signed by the United States, Denmark and Greenland on 22 September 2026 expanded the US role in Greenland's defence while affirming Danish sovereignty and Greenland's right to self-determination.

NATO's future depends on how these pressures are absorbed. One path is a more European NATO, in which European allies spend more, build their own defence industry and lead in conventional defence while the US nuclear guarantee remains. Another is gradual erosion, if doubts about US commitment lead allies to hedge. Yet the Russian threat, the Hague commitments and the absence of any substitute for the US nuclear umbrella give the alliance strong reasons to survive. For India, which stays outside all military alliances, the episode confirms the value of strategic autonomy and of partnerships that do not depend on a single power.

Post-Unipolar World

The Cold War shaped the second half of the 20th century profoundly. It set the stage for many of today's institutions and alliances, left a mixed legacy of technological progress and traumatic conflicts. Understanding its trajectory - and how it ended - is crucial to grasping current debates about whether we are entering a "new Cold War."

Is There a New Cold War?

With rising tensions in recent years - marked by a confrontational Russia, an assertive China, and a more protective U.S. stance - it is often argued if a "Cold War 2.0" is emerging. There is no consensus on this term's applicability. Some argue that today's rivalries, while serious, differ fundamentally from the original Cold War; others see strong parallels in the hostility between major powers.

Prominent scholars like Stephen Walt caution that calling current U.S.-Russia tensions a "new Cold War" is misleading . Walt notes that the original Cold War featured two roughly equal superpowers locked in a global ideological and military competition. Today's context is quite different:

The international system is no longer bipolar but "lopsided multipolar." The U.S. remains the preeminent power, while Russia is a distant second-tier player and China is an emerging peer competitor. Russia's economy (about $2 trillion GDP) is dwarfed by America's (around $27 trillion). If the Cold War was Godzilla vs. King Kong, remarks Walt, the current U.S.-Russia matchup is more Godzilla vs. Bambi.

There is no global ideological binary driving the divide. In the Cold War, liberal democracy and communism were rival ideologies. Today's Russia does not offer a compelling transnational ideology akin to Soviet communism. The competition is more about geopolitical interests than winning minds.

The confrontation is geographically narrower. U.S.-Russia friction today centers on specific regions - Eastern Europe (e.g. Ukraine), the Middle East (Syria), and cyberspace - not a worldwide contest in every theatre. During the Cold War, conflicts and proxy wars spanned from Asia to Africa to Latin America.

Further, Walt warns that equating today's situation with the Cold War might risk focusing on the "wrong enemy" - diverting attention from China's rise. Arguably, larger long-term challenge for Washington is China, not Russia. In effect, the U.S. faces a potential two-front strategic rivalry (with Beijing and Moscow), which is very different from the singular focus it had on Moscow during the Cold War.

He emphasizes that, unlike the ideological and military standoff of the original Cold War, today's U.S.-China rivalry is characterized by deep economic interdependence, technological competition, and differing visions of global order. Walt contends that both nations have conflicting interests - while the U.S. seeks to uphold a liberal, rules-based international system, China advocates for a Westphalian model emphasizing state sovereignty . He warns that mischaracterizing this competition could lead to policy missteps and unnecessary escalation.

We can characterize the present world as post-post-Cold War : unipolarity has waned, and a more contested multipolarity is emerging. U.S. power is still predominant militarily and in alliances, but it is being challenged regionally by Russia and globally by China. International institutions are still largely Western-designed (UN, Bretton Woods system), yet their efficacy and authority is undermined by rise of parallel institutions.

Still, unlike the rigid blocs of the Cold War, many countries today are non-aligned or multi-aligned . For example, India (discussed later) is courting both the U.S. (for security against China) and Russia (for defence equipment and energy). Turkey is a NATO member yet buys Russian missiles. This underscores that while the great-power competition is real, it is more complex and less all-encompassing than the U.S.-Soviet duel.

Thus, the term "Cold War 2.0" is contested. Stephen Walt and others urge caution, arguing the metaphor may oversimplify and misdirect policy. Alexei Arbatov and similar voices respond that the hostility and distrust in U.S.-Russia relations today do mirror a Cold War climate, albeit in a changed environment.

The risk, of course, is that learning the wrong lessons (either underestimating the dangers or overreacting and creating self-fulfilling prophecies) could make the world more dangerous. As one analyst put it, history may not repeat, but it often rhymes - so careful statecraft is needed to avoid a slide into a more severe confrontation.

Rise of China and Multipolarity

Perhaps the most defining structural challenge is the rise of China . Powered by decades of near-double-digit GDP growth. China used its economic clout to build modern military forces. Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has expanded its influence across Asia, Africa- effectively creating a Sino-centric economic zone. This expansion is reminiscent of the U.S. Marshall Plan and post-war economic leadership, leading some to call China an emerging "hegemon" in its own right.

India, too, is rising, albeit at a slower pace and without much spectacle. India is a civilizational state, perhaps with the longest living history. India's economy, now one of the world's largest, is growing and its population has surpassed China's, making it the largest democracy and most populous nation. India has significant military power including nuclear weapons. Above all, India has demonstrated its willingness to use hard power in the recent response to Pakistani terror attacks. It also means that U.S. can no longer take its support for granted.

Although far weaker than its Soviet predecessor, Russia under Putin has punched above its weight by exploiting opportunities and weaknesses in Western strategy. Russia's outright challenge to U.S. hegemony came with the 2008 war in Georgia and especially the 2014 seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. While Russia cannot project power globally as the U.S. can, Russia's challenge is mostly regional. It does not have the economic base to truly rival the U.S., but it has enough military might (including the world's largest nuclear arsenal) to demand Washington's attention.

Another subtle challenge to U.S. primacy has come from its own allies. Western Europe, through EU, has become an economic giant and is asserting its distinct interests. Under President Trump (2017-2021), trans-Atlantic relations hit a new low as the U.S. imposed tariffs on European goods, exited the Iran nuclear deal and Paris climate accord. European leaders like Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron publicly stated that Europe must become more self-reliant and cannot always depend on the U.S.

Additionally, Europe and the U.S. differ on how to handle powers like Russia and China. The region has strong trade with both the powers, which often conflict with the US policy. Europe's sheer economic weight and the euro currency's role also gives it leverage to challenge U.S. policies, if needed.

The global power distribution is flattening into a more multipolar shape. The challenge for the U.S. is how to navigate a world where it must share power or overextend itself in a futile bid to restore unipolarity.

This question is at the heart of the hegemony debate. Many in Washington see China as the principal long-term competitor for USA. If current trajectories continue, its GDP may equal or exceed the U.S. It is rapidly modernizing its military and is asserting leadership in international institutions. China's BRI investments in some 70 countries buy it influence and secure trade routes. Furthermore, China has started to challenge U.S. hegemony in Asia - for example, militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea. It has also signalled ambitions in cutting-edge technology of AI and quantum computing, which could translate into strategic advantages.

However, whether China can surpasses the USA is not guaranteed. It faces considerable headwinds: a rapidly aging population, environmental crise, and pushback from other powers wary of Chinese dominance. Moreover, becoming a superpower is not just about raw metrics, but also global leadership and trust. Its handling of the COVID-19 outbreak's early stages and aggressive "wolf-warrior" diplomacy have harmed its reputation. Beijing often emphasizes non-interference and sovereignty, which but hasn't yet shown willingness to provide global public goods. If China remains unwilling to take on certain burdens, its superpower status could be limited.

Dr. Samir Saran, and author of Pax Sinica: Implications for the Indian Dawn, offers a nuanced critique of China's aspirations to superpower status. He highlights several structural and strategic limitations that impede the rise of China.

1. Fragile Political Structure: Dr. Saran points out that China's centralized political system, characterized by the concentration of power in the Communist Party and the absence of democratic institutions, fosters internal insecurity. This brittleness within its polity undermines the stability required for sustained global leadership.

2. Lack of Soft Power: Despite its economic prowess, China struggles to project soft power effectively. Its cultural and political models have limited appeal globally, and its assertive foreign policies often alienate other nations. This deficiency hampers China's ability to build the international alliances and goodwill necessary for superpower status.

3. Economic and Technological Challenges: China's rapid economic growth faces headwinds, including an aging population, environmental degradation, and the challenges of transitioning from manufacturing to innovation-driven industries. Additionally, its technological advancements are often viewed with suspicion, leading to pushback from other countries concerned about security and intellectual property issues.

4. Global Perception and Trust Deficit: Dr. Saran emphasizes that China's global image suffers due to its handling of international issues, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and territorial disputes. The lack of transparency and aggressive diplomacy contribute to a trust deficit, making other nations wary of China's intentions and reducing its influence on the world stage.

5. Resistance from Other Powers: China's rise is met with resistance from established and emerging powers. Along with USA, India and members of the EU are strengthening their own strategic positions to counterbalance China's assertiveness. It limits Chinese ability to unilaterally shape global norms and institutions.

Dr. Saran argues that while China has made significant strides economically and militarily, these achievements are insufficient for true superpower status without corresponding reforms and trust-building. The combination of internal vulnerabilities and external resistance suggests that China's path to becoming a global superpower is fraught with challenges.

Power Transition Theory and US-China Relations

A.F.K. Organski set out power transition theory in World Politics (1958) and developed it with Jacek Kugler in The War Ledger (1980). Unlike balance of power theory, which expects peace when power is evenly distributed, power transition theory holds that peace is most secure when a dominant power enjoys clear preponderance and that war is most likely when a challenger approaches parity.

• Hierarchy: the system is a hierarchy with a dominant power at the top, followed by great powers, middle powers and small powers. The dominant power shapes the international order and its rules in its own interest.
• Differential growth: power changes mainly through internal development, that is industrialisation, population and political capacity, rather than through alliances. Uneven growth carries rising powers up the hierarchy.
• Satisfaction: a rising power that is satisfied with the existing order can overtake peacefully, as the United States overtook Britain. A dissatisfied challenger that approaches parity seeks to change the rules, and war becomes likely.

Graham Allison popularised the idea as the Thucydides Trap in Destined for War (2017). Drawing on Thucydides' account of Athens and Sparta, his Harvard study found that in twelve of sixteen cases over the past five hundred years in which a rising power challenged a ruling one, the outcome was war.

The theory captures much of the dynamic of US-China relations. China's economy is the world's largest by purchasing power parity and second in market terms, it has built the world's largest navy by number of ships, and it presses its claims over Taiwan and in the South China Sea, where it rejected the 2016 arbitral award in the case brought by the Philippines. It has also built alternative institutions such as the Belt and Road Initiative (2013) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which some read as signs of dissatisfaction with a US-led order. The United States, for its part, treats China as its main strategic competitor and has imposed tariffs since 2018 and export controls on advanced semiconductors since 2022.

The fit is imperfect. Nuclear weapons make a hegemonic war far costlier than in earlier transitions, and the two economies remain deeply interdependent. China has gained greatly from the existing order and works within the UN, the WTO and the IMF, which led Alastair Iain Johnston ('Is China a Status Quo Power?', 2003) to question whether it is truly revisionist. China's slowing growth and ageing population may also prevent it from reaching parity at all.

For South and South-East Asia the rivalry brings both risk and opportunity. Small states fear being forced to choose, and most ASEAN members hedge, taking Chinese trade and investment while welcoming the US security presence. The Quad of India, the United States, Japan and Australia, revived in 2017, and AUKUS (2021) are responses to Chinese power, while debt-financed projects such as Sri Lanka's Hambantota port, leased to a Chinese company in 2017, have raised fears of dependence. For India the rivalry raises its value as a partner of the West, but the Galwan clash of June 2020 showed that it also faces Chinese pressure directly. The Asian order is moving from US primacy towards a contested multipolarity in which middle powers such as India, Japan and Indonesia carry greater weight.

Russia, Ukraine and the 'Greater Russia' Debate

The Ukraine crisis has unfolded in two stages. In November 2013 President Viktor Yanukovych suspended plans to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union under Russian pressure, and the Euromaidan protests drove him from office in February 2014. Russia then seized and annexed Crimea in March 2014, an annexation the UN General Assembly refused to recognise in resolution 68/262, and backed separatists in the Donbas, where the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 failed to bring a settlement. On 24 February 2022 Russia launched a full-scale invasion, and in September 2022 it claimed to annex four Ukrainian regions, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, after staged referendums. As of October 2026 the war continues, with Russia occupying roughly a fifth of Ukraine. US-brokered diplomacy since 2025, including the Alaska summit of August 2025 and a US peace plan, has produced brief truces but no ceasefire or peace agreement.

The 'Greater Russia' reading. One view holds that the present regime seeks to restore Russian dominance over the former Soviet space:

• In 2005 Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union a major geopolitical disaster of the century, and his essay 'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians' (July 2021) presented Russians and Ukrainians as one people.
• The idea of the 'Russian world' (Russkiy mir) and of a 'near abroad' treats Russian speakers and the former Soviet republics as a Russian sphere of influence.
• The pattern of action includes the war with Georgia (2008) and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the annexation of Crimea (2014), the 2022 invasion and the deepening Union State with Belarus.
• Institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union (2015) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization bind neighbours to Moscow.

The power politics and geopolitics reading. Realists argue that the crisis is a product of power politics rather than imperial nostalgia. John Mearsheimer's article 'Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault' (Foreign Affairs, 2014) traced it to NATO's eastward expansion, especially the Bucharest summit declaration of 2008 that Ukraine and Georgia would become members, to EU enlargement and to Western democracy promotion, all of which Russia saw as threats to its security. Ukraine's location, its Black Sea coast and the Russian naval base at Sevastopol give it a strategic value that no Russian government would ignore. On this view Russia is a declining great power defending a buffer zone, not a power seeking to rebuild the Soviet Union.

Critics of the realist view note that it denies agency to Ukraine and to the Central European states that chose to join NATO, and that Russia's war aims and rhetoric go beyond security. Ukraine also gave up the Soviet nuclear weapons on its soil under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 in return for assurances of its territorial integrity, which Russia then violated. Most scholars combine the two readings, since security fears and imperial identity reinforce each other in Russian policy. India has abstained on UN resolutions condemning Russia, continued to buy Russian oil and defence equipment and called for dialogue and diplomacy, with Prime Minister Modi telling President Putin in 2022 that this is not an era of war.